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Recent Decisions
The Standard Pollution Exclusion Clause in
Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies
Bars Coverage for Personal Injuries Resulting from
On-Site Exposure to Pollutants Discharged Within a
Construction Envelope: Madison Construction Co.
v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.
INSURANCE CONTRACTS - COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES -
POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the standard pollution exclusion clause in commercial
general liability policies, which bars coverage for the discharge of
pollutants, is clear and unambiguous on its face, thereby requiring
application of the clause's plain and ordinary meaning to bar
coverage for personal injuries caused by exposure to fumes
discharged by a useful product within a construction envelope.
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.,
735 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1999).
In 1991, Kelran Associates, Inc. ("Kelran"), a general contractor,
was engaged in a construction project at the BoeingVertol
Helicopters plant ("Boeing").' Kelran hired Madison Construction
Company ("Madison"), a subcontractor, to install utility trenches
inside a Boeing building.2 Construction of the trenches involved the
pouring of concrete and the application of a curing agent known as
1. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 802, 803 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996).
2. See Madison Constr., 678 A.2d at 803.
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Eucocure Floor Coat. 3 In order to capture and prevent the
Eucocure fumes from escaping into the Boeing building, Madison
enclosed the construction site in a polyethelene bubble, also known
as a "construction envelope."
4
Even with the construction envelope, the strong odor produced
by the Eucocure Floor Coat permeated the Boeing building.
5
Nicholas Ezzi, an employee of Boeing, was instructed to set up a
fan inside the construction envelope to increase ventilation and
reduce the odor in the building.6 As Mr. Ezzi entered the
construction envelope with the fan, he was overcome by the
Eucocure fumes, causing him to faint and fall into one of the utility
trenches, where he suffered severe and permanent injuries. 7 As a
result, Mr. Ezzi brought a negligence action against Madison.
8
At the time of the accident, The Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Company ("Harleysville") insured Madison under a commercial
general liability policy.9 This policy "requir[ed] Harleysville to
defend Madison in any lawsuit that fell within the parameters of
coverage."10  However, the policy also contained a pollution
exclusion clause that excluded coverage for "'bodily injury' or
'property damage' arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
pollutants."1' Harleysville was informed of Mr. Ezzi's accident but it
3. See id. Madison's contract with Kelran required it to apply a curing agent such as
Eucocure Floor Coat to the utility trenches that it constructed. See Madison Constr. Co. v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 103 (Pa. 1999).




8. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 102. Also named as defendants in Mr. Ezzi's suit
were Kelran, the general contractor, and Kelran's project superintendent, Brian Murtaugh.
See id. Kelran and Murtaugh later joined Euclid Chemical Company, the manufacturer of the
Eucocure Floor Coat, as a third party defendant. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 102-03. The pollution exclusion clause explicitly states as follows:
This Insurance does not apply to: . . . f. (1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage"
arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage,
migration, release or escape of pollutants: (a) At or from any premises, site or
location which is or was at any time owned occupied by, or rented or loaned to any
insured; ... (d) At or from any premises, site or location on which any insured or any
contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on any insured's behalf
are performing operations: (i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the premises, site
or location in connection with such operations by such insured, contractor or
subcontractor ....
Id. The term "pollutant" is defined in the policy as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
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denied coverage and refused to defend Madison against Mr. Ezzi's
lawsuit based on the policy's pollution exclusion clause. 12 Upon
denial of its claim, Madison filed a declaratory judgment action to
determine if Harleysville was contractually obligated to defend Mr.
Ezzi's suit.1 3 Madison and Harleysville both moved for summary
judgment.
14
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Madison.'5
Due to the lack of controlling Pennsylvania appellate authority, the
trial court based its ruling on an interipretation of a similar
pollution exclusion clause by the intermediate appellate court of
North Carolina in West American Insurance Co. v. Tufco
Flooring.
1 6
Relying on Tafco Mooring, the trial court first concluded that the
policy's definition of "pollutants" did not extend to the present
situation because Madison had not brought vapors or fumes to the
construction site.'7 Rather, it had brought a "pure raw material,"
Eucocure Floor Coat, which was neither an irritant nor a
contaminant as required by the pollution exclusion clause. 18 The
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and
waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed." Id. Today,
pollution exclusion clauses are one of the most litigated clauses in commercial general
liability policies. See id. at 106.
12. See id. at 102.
13. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 103. A declaratory judgment is a "[s]tatutory
remedy for the determination of a justiciable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to
his legal rights." BLACK'S LAw DTIONARY 409 (6th ed. 1990).
14. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 103. A summary judgment is a "[p]rocedural
device available for prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy without trial when
there is no dispute as to either material fact or inferences to be drawn from undisputed
facts, or if only question of law is involved." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990).
15. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 103.
16. See id. (citing 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991), overruled in part by Gaston
County Dyeing v. Northfield Ins., 524 S.E.2d 558 (N.C. 2000)). No Pennsylvania appellate
court had yet interpreted the term "pollutant" in a pollution exclusion clause. See Madison
Constr., 735 A.2d at 103.
17. See id.
18. See id. In Tufco Flooring, Tihfco was resurfacing the floors of a Perdue chicken
processing plant with a styrene monomer resin. See id. Fumes created by the resin allegedly
contaminated chicken in a nearby freezer. See id. West American denied coverage of
Perdue's claim against Tufco based on a similar pollution exclusion clause in Tufco's policy,
and Tufco sought a declaratory judgment to determine if West American was contractually
obligated to defend the claim. See id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's entry of a summary judgment in favor of Tufco. See id. The appellate court explained
that:
Tufco did not bring the vapors or fumes which invaded the chicken to the Perdue
plant. Rather Tufco brought an unadulterated, pure raw material, styrene monomer
resin, in one-gallon metal cans with screw-on caps. When this raw material was
brought onto the site, it was neither an "irritant [nor a] contaminant." It was a raw
2000
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court next concluded, again relying on Thfco Fooring, that no
event had occurred to trigger the pollution exclusion clause.19 The
court reasoned that even though there was no explicit language in
the policy requiring that the alleged pollution escape into the
environment, the history of these pollution exclusion clauses, as
outlined by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, clearly mandated
such an implicit requirement. 0 Relying on this implicit requirement
interpretation, the trial court held that the pollution exclusion
clause had not been triggered because the Eucocure Floor Coat
had not escaped the construction envelope and therefore had not
entered the environment.
21
Harleysville appealed the entry of summary judgment in
Madison's favor, and a divided panel of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed the trial court but on different grounds.2  The
appellate court flatly rejected the lower court's conclusion that the
policy's defition of a "pollutant" did not extend to the Eucocure
fumes.23 However, the superior court stated "that the pollution
exclusion was ambiguous in light of the existence of two contrary
schools of thought concerning its interpretation"24 and therefore
material used by Tufco in its normal business activity of resurfacing floors. Yet, to be
a "pollutant" under the exclusion, a substance must be precisely that, an "irritant or
contaminant."
Madison Const., 735 A.2d at 103 (quoting Thfco Rooring, 409 S.E.2d at 698).
19. See Madison Constr., 735 A,2d at 104.
20. See id. In Tufco Flooring, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that, prior to
1985, the pollution exclusion clause in general commercial liability policies was a qualified
exclusion that required the alleged pollution to escape into the environment. Tufco Flooring,
409 S.E.2d at 699. The court explained that the purpose of this exclusion was to limit an
insurer's potentially infinite liability arising from the repeated escape of toxic materials into
the environment and that "[tihe historical purpose of the pollution exclusion [therefore]
limits the scope of the exclusion to environmental damage." Id. Based on this historical
purpose, the court reasoned that the change in 1985, to an absolute exclusion, which does
not require the escape of the alleged pollutants into the environment, had no effect on the
scope of the exclusion. Id. Consequently, the court held that even in the absence of explicit
language, the exclusion still required the escape of pollutants into the environment. Id. The
court was unwilling to expand the scope of the exclusion so that it could be used by
insurers to deny coverage for non-environmental damage. Id.
21. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 104.
22. See id.
23. See id. The court reasoned that: "While the floor-covering material itself was a
necessary instrument of Madison's work, the vapors, however unavoidable, were not. They
were an unwanted irritating waste product of the floor covering, and thus could be
construed to fit within the policy's definition of pollution." Id.
24. Id. "According to one school of thought, the exclusion did not apply where the
pollution in question was not environmental or industrial in nature; according to the other,
the exclusion was indeed absolute and applied to any set of facts that came within the literal
meaning of its terms." Id.
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should be construed against the drafter of the policy and in favor
of the insured.25 The superior court based its conclusion that the
pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous on its earlier holding in
Cohen v. Erie Indemnity Co.26 In Cohen, the superior court held
that a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when several
appellate courts have ruled in favor of contrary interpretations of
similar clauses.
27
Upon affirmation of the trial court's entry of summary judgment
in favor of Madison, Harleysville moved for reargument en banc,
and the superior court granted the motion.28 "The en banc court
reversed the trial court, concluding that the pollution exclusion
clause clearly and unambiguously applied to relieve Harleysville of
its obligation to defend Madison."29 Writing for the en banc court,
President Judge Emeritus Cirillo noted that Thfco Fooring, upon
which Madison and the trial court had relied, carried no
precedential value in Pennsylvania.30 Accordingly, the court first
concluded that the pollution exclusion clause contained no explicit
or implicit requirement that the alleged "pollutants" escape into the
environment.31 The court next concluded that the policy's definition
of "pollutants" did extend to the fumes created by the Eucocure
25. See id. at 105. "Where a provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is
to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement.
Where, however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required
to give effect to that language." Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d
563, 566 (Pa. 1983) (internal citation omitted).
26. 432 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super Ct. 1981).
27. See Madison Construction, 735 A.2d at 104-05. The precise holding that Judge
Olszewski relied upon in Cohen was: "The mere fact that several appellate courts have ruled
in favor of a construction denying coverage, and several others have reached directly
contrary conclusions, viewing almost identical policy provisions, itself creates the
inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one
interpretation." Id. (quoting Cohen, 432 A.2d at 599).
Several appellate courts, such as the North Carolina Court of Appeals, have denied
coverage for non-environmental damage under similar pollution exclusion clauses, while
other appellate courts have permitted coverage for non-environmental damage under these
clauses. See Tufco Flooring, 409 S.E.2d at 699.
28. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105. En banc "refers to a session where the entire
membership of the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum."
BLACK's LAw DIcTONARY 526-27 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105.
30. Madison Constr., 678 A.2d at 806.
31. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105. The superior court noted that "because the
Harleysville-Madison provision contains no such 'into the environment' language, we as a
court, will not 'convolute the plain meaning of a writing merely to find an ambiguity.'"
Madison Constr., 678 A.2d at 806 (quoting O'Brien Energy Sys. Inc. v. Am. Employer's Ins.
Co., 629 A.2d 957, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
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Floor Coat.3 2 As such, Harleysville was under no obligation to
defend the claims against Madison. 33
Madison appealed the superior court's reversal of the trial
court.3 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur because
no appellate court in Pennsylvania had yet addressed the issue of
whether a pollution exclusion clause "precludes coverage for an
injury arising from exposure to the fumes of a useful product such
as Eucocure Floor Coat."35 -On appeal, Madison argued that the
policy's language was clear and unambiguous and that the
Eucocure Floor Coat was not a "pollutant" and that even if it was,
no event had occurred to trigger the exclusion because there was
no "escape" or "discharge" of it.36 In the alternative, Madison
argued that if the language of the exclusion was found to be
ambiguous, the policy must therefore be construed in its favor.3 7
Madison further argued that Mr Ezzi's claim of negligence was
based on a "failure to warn [and] not on the use or release of
32. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105. The superior court explained that:
This court simply cannot construe the policy language any way other than by finding
that the fumes in the instant case were pollutants. First, the language of the exclusion
provision clearly states that "fumes" are regarded as a "pollutant." Second, when
canisters of a liquid or other compound are brought onto a premises, opened, and the
material, upon exposure to the air or after application to a surface, causes noxious
fumes to emanate and make persons dizzy, the fumes are clearly pollutants.
Madison Constr., 678 A.2d at 806.
33. Madison Constr., 678 A.2d at 807. Judge Del Sole filed a dissenting opinion in
which Judges Cavanaugh and Beck joined, and in which President Judge McEwen concurred
in the result. Id. (Del Sole, J., dissenting). In Judge Del Sole's opinion, the claim against
Madison was based on its negligent acts and not on Madison's "discharge" of a pollutant;
therefore, the claim was not excluded from coverage under the pollution exclusion clause.
Id. at 808 (Del Sole, J., dissenting). He stated that:
The injuries claimed by [E]zzi in his complaint have not been alleged to have resulted
from Madison's "discharge" of a pollutant. The claims set forth against Madison in
[E]zzi's complaint stem from Madison's neglect in failing to warn and protect others
from the situation, failing to ventilate the area and failing to cover a hole into which
[E]zzi fell. These alleged negligent acts by Madison are not excluded in the Harleysvile
policy.
Id. (Del Sole, J., dissenting). Judge Del Sole also stated that the Eucocure Floor Coat was
not a pollutant within the definition of that term in the pollution exclusion clause because it
was a useful product. Id. at 810 (Del Sole, J., dissenting). He argued that a product that "was
neither objectionable nor unwanted" could never be deemed an "irritant" or "contaminant"
under a pollution exclusion clause. Id. at 809 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
34. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105.
35. Id. at 105-06. Allocatur is "an order or writ of a court . . . granting something
requested [such] as an order 'allowing an appeal." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 57 (1986).
36. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105.
37. Id.
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pollutants."38
The supreme court held that Mr. Ezzi's claim against Madison did
fall within the pollution exclusion clause and therefore Harleysville
was relieved of its contractual duty to defend the suit.39 The
majority opinion was authored by Justice Saylor, who began his
analysis by stating that in interpreting an insurance policy, a court's
only goal must be "to ascertain the intent of the parties as
manifested by the language of the written instrument."40 Justice
Saylor explained that the language of the insurance policy is
therefore the key factor in properly resolving this controversy.41
The majority first determined that the policy's definition of
"pollutant" clearly and unambiguously applied to the Eucocure
Floor Coat.42 Justice Saylor explained that in determining whether
there is an ambiguity, the product in question must be analyzed "by
reference to a particular set of facts."43 The majority relied on a
material safety data report prepared by Euclid Chemical Company,
the manufacturer of the Eucocure Floor Coat.44 The report stated
that Eucocure Floor Coat contained several toxic chemicals, one of
which is a suspected carcinogen and others that are categorized as
either hazardous air pollutants or toxic chemicals by the federal
government.4" The report also noted that the product's vapors can
be irritating and that exposure to them can cause physical illness.46
Based on this report, the majority concluded that regardless of the
fact that the Eucocure Floor Coat was a useful and necessary
product, it is an "irritant."47 Consequently, the Eucocure Floor Coat
38. Id. Following the rationale of Judge Del Sole's dissent, Madison argued that Mr.
Ezzi's injuries were caused by its failure to warn Boeing employees of the fumes and not by
the "discharge" of the fumes; therefore, the pollution exclusion clause was inapplicable to
Mr. Ezzi's claim. Madison Constr., 678 A.2d at 808.
39. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 102.
40. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Standard Venetian Blind, 469 A.2d at 566).
41. Id. at 106. Justice Saylor explained that to resolve this controversy properly, a
court must insert the policy's definition of a "pollutant" into the exclusion and then proceed
to interpret the exclusion. Id. According to Justice Saylor, the exclusion therefore reads: "the
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
. . . any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste [, . . . alt or from any premises, site, or
location . . . occupied by. . . [the] insured[.]" Id. at 106-07 (alterations in original).
42. Id. at 107.
43. Id.
44. Madison Constr, 735 A.2d at 107.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The material safety data report as summarized by the court states that:
[tIhese products may contain approximately "3-4% Xylene... ; 2-3% Cumene... ; 40%
2000
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was clearly and unambiguously a "pollutant" under the insurance
policy.
48
The majority next determined that the policy's definitions of
"discharge" or "escape" clearly and unambiguously applied to this
factual situation.49 Justice Saylor noted that the insurance policy
did not define these terms, so they "are to be construed in their
natural, plain, and ordinary sense" because they are "[w]ords of
common usage in an insurance policy."50 He stated that the concept
of movement was the essence of all of these terms; consequently,
he reasoned that the exclusion applied to this factual situation
because when the Eucocure Floor Coat was applied to the utility
trenches, it moved "into the air above and around the trenches."
51
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
reliance on Tufco Flooring.52 Relying on Thfco Mooring, the trial
court had held that the terms "discharge" or "escape" still require
that the alleged "pollutant" enter the environment in order to
trigger the pollution exclusion clause.', In Thfco Mooring, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of
these exclusions was to limit an insurer's liability with regards to
environmental damage caused by pollution; therefore, this historical
purpose limited the scope of the exclusion strictly to environmental
damage and required that the pollution enter the environment.4 In
Trimethylbenze [sic] . . . .which are considered toxic chemicals and 0.2 to 0.3 %
Styrene . . . ; which is a suspected carcinogen." Xylene, cumene, and styrene have
been classified as hazardous air pollutants by the- federal government. 42 U.S.C. §
7412(b). In addition, the report states that the products' vapors may be irritating, that
overexposure to such vapors "may cause CNS [central nervous system] effects,
vertigo, muscular weakness, narcosis, confusion, [and] coma[,]" and that "[linhalation
of dusts and vapors should be avoided."
Id. (alterations in original).
48. Id. The term "pollutant" is defined in the policy as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or
thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalais,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."
Madison Constr., 735 Ak2d at 103 (emphasis added).
An "irritant" is something that "tend[s] to produce irritation or inflammation." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1197 (1986).
49. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 109.
50. Id. at 108 (citing Easton v. Washington County Ins. Co., 137 A.2d 332, 335 (Pa.
1957)). A "discharge" is "a flowing or issuing out." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICIONARY 644 (1986). An "escape" is "to issue from confinement or an enclosure." Id. at
774.
51. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 108.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Tufco Flooring, 409 S.E.2d at 699.
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Madison Construction, the trial court adopted this approach.55
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that this
reasoning violated "settled principles of contract interpretation"
because it failed to apply the plain meaning of "discharge" or
"escape."5 The "plain meaning" of "discharge" or "escape" without
the qualification of "into the environment" simply requires
movement of the alleged "pollutant."57 Based on this interpretation,
the supreme court held that the movement of the Eucocure Floor
Coat from the concrete "into the air above and around the
trenches" within the construction envelope was sufficient to trigger
the exclusion.5 The court declined to read into the exclusion an
implicit requirement that the alleged "pollutant" escape into the
environment beyond the construction envelope.5 9
Finally, the majority concluded that Madison's argument that Mr.
Ezzi's claim of negligence was based on a "failure to warn [and] not
on the use or release of pollutants"6° had no merit.61 Justice Saylor
explained that regardless of the language used in Mr. Ezzi's
complaint, his injuries were the result of "the release of the
irritating fumes at the construction site" and therefore his claim fell
within the pollution exclusion clause.
62
Three justices filed dissenting opinions.63 Justice Cappy's dissent
reasoned that the phrase "arising out of" in the pollution exclusion
clause was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against
Harleysville, the insurer. 4 Additionally, Justice Cappy believed that
the maj6 rity's "strictly literal interpretation" of the exclusion would
lead to "absurd" results not contemplated by either party to the
55. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 108.
56. Id.
57. Id. Justice Saylor stated that:
If the pollution exclusion clause, by its express terms, does not require that a
discharge or dispersal be "into the environment" or "into the atmosphere," then the
court is not at liberty to insert such a requirement in order to effect what it considers
to be the true or correct meaning of the clause.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 108.
60. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 105.
61. Id. at 110.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy explained that "[i]n construing the term
'arising out of' in the context of the pollution exclusion, it is questionable whether the
phrase requires merely a causal relationship (i.e., a 'but for' relationship) or a proximate
cause relationship." Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
2000 957
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insurance contract.65 Justice Nigro's dissent concluded that Mr.
Ezzi's allegations of negligence were not based upon Madison's
discharge of "pollutants," but rather on "Madison's failure to warn
and protect others from the hazardous situation."6  Consequently,
Justice Nigro concluded that Mr. Ezzi's suit did not trigger the
pollution exclusion clause.67 Justice Newman dissented because he
believed that the trial court could not have properly determined
whether the Eucocure Floor Coat was a pollutant "without a
factual determination of the composition of the specific product at
issue. "68
In the first half of this century there was virtually no public
concern about environmental pollution. 69 However, by the early
1960s, the public began to realize that environmental contamination
created grave dangers to both the earth and its inhabitants. 0 As
awareness of these dangers grew, the government and private
citizens began a legal attack on polluters, which has increased in
ferocity over time.71 As a result, both federal and state legislatures
have enacted statutes that impose near infinite liability on polluters
for environmental damage caused by hazardous discharges.7 2 With
the ever increasing liability of polluters, insurance companies
"attempted to limit [their] coverage of pollution related losses"
through the insertion of pollution exclusion clauses in commercial
insurance agreements. 73 By 1970, these pollution exclusion clauses
were a standard feature of virtually all commercial general liability
65. Madison Constr., 735A.2d at 111 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy gave two
examples of such absurd results:
Reading the clause broadly would bar coverage for bodily injuries sufferd by one who
slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano, and for bodily injury
caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a public pool. Although Drano and
chlorine are both irritants or contaminants that cause, under certain conditions, bodily
injury or property damage, one would not ordinarily characterize these events as
pollution.
Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 112 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 111-12 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 113 (Newman, J., dissenting).
69. See Robert M. Tyler Jr. & Todd J. Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in
Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO
LAw REv. 497 (1981).
70. See id.
71. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking
Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1986).
72. See id. at 1237-39.
73. See id. at 1239-40.
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policies.74
These clauses have led to "an explosion of litigation" as insurers
and their insured struggle over whether the exclusion applies to
particular pollution events.75 Courts have had tremendous difficulty
in resolving these disputes because of the widespread inconsistency
in the interpretation of these exclusions, especially in the
interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
exclusion.
7
Pennsylvania appellate courts have interpreted these pollution
exclusion clauses on several occasions. The first significant case
interpreting such exclusions is the 1984 case of Techatloy Co. Inc.
v. Reliance Insurance Co.77 In that case, Reliance Insurance
Company ("Reliance") denied coverage of a claim against Techalloy
based on the pollution exclusion clause in the policy and on the
grounds that the complaint failed to allege property damage or
personal injury.7 The pollution exclusion clause in this case not
only required that the pollution escape into the environment, but
also that the escape be "sudden and accidental."7 9 The case was
certified as a class action personal injury suit based on the
allegation that Techalloy had negligently exposed its neighbors to
the toxic chemical trichloroethylene (TCE). 0
Upon denial of its claim, Techalloy successfully defended the
74. See id. at 1239-40. An example of a standard pollution exclusion clause from 1970
follows:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Id. at 1251.
75. Id. at 1237.
76. See Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 1253-54.
77. 487 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 826. Reliance Insurance Company's general commercial liability policy
contained a pollution exclusion similar to the exclusion in note 74.
80. See id. at 822. Techalloy is a company that strips and cuts steel and TCE is used in
this process. See id. The class action suit alleged that Techalloy negligently stored or
dumped TCE on its premises, thereby exposing its neighbors to the toxic chemical through
contamination of the ground water. See id.
A class action suit "provides a means by which, where a large group of persons are
interested in a matter, one or more may sue or be sued as representatives of the class
without needing to join every member of the class." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 249 (6th ed.
1990).
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class action suit through the use of private counsel.81 It then filed
suit against Reliance, seeking reimbursement for the expenses
incurred in the defense of the class action suit.82 "Reliance filed
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer" claiming that
the pollution exclusion clause negated its duty to defend Techalloy
because the water contamination was not "sudden and
accidental." 83 The trial court granted the preliminary objections.84
On appeal, Techalloy argued that the water contamination was
"sudden and accidental" and that the pollution exclusion therefore
did not apply.8 The Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that
the terms "sudden and accidental" were clear and unambiguous and
therefore their plain and ordinary meaning must be applied.
86
Although Techalloy may be able to show that the contamination
was "accidental," the court found that the contamination could not
be "sudden" because it occurred gradually over 25 years.87 Based
on this plain and ordinary meaning, the court concluded that no
coverage exists under the policy unless the toxic discharge is both
sudden and accidental.
88
The next significant Pennsylvania case interpreting these
pollution exclusions was the 1989 case of Lower Paxon Township
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co ("USF&G"). 89 In that
case, again, the superior court was faced with a pollution exclusion
that contained the requirement that the pollution escape into the
environment as well as the "sudden and accidental" exception to
the exclusion.90 Lower Paxon Township operated a landfill that was
leaching methane gas into the basement of a neighboring home.91




85. Id. at 826.
86. Techalloy, 487 A.2d at 826 (citing Monti v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 450 A.2d 24, 25 (Pa.
1982)).
87. Id. at 826-27. Other jurisdictions have refused to apply the plain and ordinary
meaning of the term "sudden and accidental." One court concluded that "acts are sudden and
accidental regardless of how many deposits or dispersals may have occurred and although
the permeation of the pollution into the ground water may have been gradual rather than
sudden." Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990,
994-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
88. See TechaUoy, 487 A.2d at 826-27.
89. 557 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
90. See Lower Paxon, 557 A.2d at 397.
91. See id. at 396. Methane gas is produced by landfills as organic materials
decompose. See id. at 394. It is an odorless and colorless gas that is highly flammable. See
Id. It either escapes through the soil covering the landfill into the atmosphere or it migrates
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The township expended $200,000 in remedying the methane gas
problem in the home and in the landfill as a whole and requested
USF&G to reimburse it.92 USF&G denied coverage based on the
pollution exclusion clause in the policy.9 3 The township sued and
prevailed at the trial level.94
On appeal, USF&G argued that the leaching of methane gas into
the neighboring homeowner's basement was not "sudden and
accidental" and therefore coverage for the cost of the remediation
was excluded.9 5 The township argued that the pollution exclusion
was ambiguous and should therefore be construed against the
insurer.9 6 Relying on Techafoy, the superior court concluded that
the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous and that the
plain and ordinary meaning of its terms must therefore be applied.9
It then provided an explicit explanation of 'the meaning of the
exclusion: "[t]hat meaning is simply that damages resulting from a
pollution discharge are covered only if the discharge itself is both
sudden, meaning abrupt and lasting only a short time, and
accidental, meaning unexpected."98 Relying on this interpretation,
the court held that the exclusion precluded coverage because the
facts indicated that the methane gas had been migrating into the
homeowner's basement for several years, thus negating the viability
of a claim of a "sudden" discharge.99
In Lower Paxon, in addition to determining the meaning of the
language in the pollution exclusion clause, the court also addressed
the issue of what role public policy should play in the
interpretation of these exclusions.' °° Amici curiae writing in support
of the Township argued that excluding coverage in these situations
would cause municipal governments to collapse under the weight
laterally underground as it did in this case. See id.
92. See id. The Township sealed the basement of the home and installed vents around
its foundation. See id. at 395-96. It also installed a gas migration control system along the
northern edge of the landfill which captured the gas and vented it into the atmosphere. See
id. at 394.
93. See id.
94. See id. "Following a jury trial, a verdict for the Township in the amount of
$212,000 was returned" and USF&G appealed. Id.
95. See Lower Paxon, 557 A.2d at 396.
96. See id. at 398.
97. Id. at 403.
98. Id. at 399.
99. Id. at 403. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
entered judgment for USF&G. Id. at 404.
100. Lower Paxon, 557 A.2d at 397.
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of their environmental liabilities. 101 Nevertheless, the court held that
no public policy, no matter what its merits, can be permitted to
interfere with the plain meaning of the contract.
10 2
Additionally, the court considered what role the drafting history
and the regulatory approval process of the exclusion should play in
the interpretation of the exclusion.10 3 Amici curiae writing in
support of the township argued that "the Township's
coverage-promoting interpretation of the exclusion is correct
because it was the insurer's own interpretation at the time they
drafted it and was the interpretation relied upon by insurance
regulators in approving it."1 4 Bound by its holding that the
language of the exclusion was clear and unambiguous on its face,
the court was barred from inferring the drafter's subjective intent
through extrinsic evidence and it applied the plain and ordinary
meaning of the exclusion.
10 5
The final significant Pennsylvania case interpreting pollution
exclusion clauses is the 1993 case of O'Brien Energy Systems Inc.,
v. American Employers' Insurance Co. 106 In that case, again, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court was faced with a pollution exclusion
clause that contained the requirement that the pollution escape into
the environment as well as the "sudden and accidental" exception
to the exclusion. 10 7 O'Brien Energy Systems ("O'Brien") sought a
declaratory judgment to determine whether American Employers'
Insurance Company ("American") was obligated to defend a suit
101. Id. Amicus curiae is a
person [or an entity] with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an
action, but not a party to the action, [who] may petition the court for permission to
file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale
consistent with its own views.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990).
102. Lower Paxon, 557 A.2d at 397. The court adopted the reasoning of the Appellate
Division of New Jersey, which was faced with similar policy arguments:
[W]e underscore the limited nature of our inquiry. Whatever the relative merits of the
competing public policies.., we perceive no legal principle which would permit us to
circumvent what the contract says. So it throws no light to inveigh against the
"collapse of the pollution insurance market" . . . or, on the other hand, to argue that
protection of "blameless victims" is best served by seeking to spread the financial risk
.... Our role is merely to interpret the language of the insurance contract.
Id. (quoting Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 528 A.2d 76, 80 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987)).
103. Lower Paxon, 557 A.2d at 402-03.
104. Id. at 402 n.5.
105. Id. at 402-03.
106. 629 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993).
107. See O'Brien Energy, 629 A.2d at 960-61. The American general commercial liability
policy contains a pollution exclusion clause that is similar to the exclusion found in note 74.
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against it for property damage caused by the leaching of methane
gas from a landfill. 08 American denied coverage of the claim
against O'Brien based on the pollution exclusion clause in O'Brien's
policy, and the trial court held that coverage was excluded.10
On appeal, O'Brien argued that the exclusion did not apply to
this situation because it was not an active polluter."0 Relying on
Lower Paxon, the superior court concluded that the pollution
exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous and that its plain and
ordinary meaning therefore must be applied."' The court held that
coverage is barred for claims based on the escape of pollutants
regardless of the role the insured played in causing the escape.
12
The court held that the terms "active" and "passive" polluter were
not part of the exclusion and that it could not read such terms into
the exclusion clause." 3 As such, O'Brien's claims were excluded
under the policy because the migration of methane was not
"sudden.""l4
Although Techalloy, Lower Paxon, and O'Brien Energy, all of
which deal with qualified pollution exclusion clauses, establish the
108. See id. at 959. SmithKline Beecham Corporation purchased a quarry from National
Gypsum Company, which included an assignment of a lease with Montgomery County. See
id. Montgomery County operated a landfill on a portion of the quarry property pursuant to
the lease, and SmithKline and the County granted a license to O'Brien to extract methane
gas from the landfill. See id. In 1987, methane from the landfill leached into a SmithKline
utility conduit on its property, causing an explosion. See id. SmithKline filed suit against
Montgomery County to recover its property damages, and the County joined O'Brien Energy
as a defendant. See id.
109. See id. at 959-60.
110. See id. at 962. O'Brien argued that the averments in the complaint against it were
based on the negligent "design, installation, maintenance and operation of its gas to energy
facility" and that contamination caused by negligence made it a passive polluter. See id.
111. Id.
112. O'Brien Energy, 629 A-2d at 963.
113. Id. The Court adopted the reasoning of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania:
[T]he clause in question excludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage
"arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants, subject to the
exception for "sudden and accidental" discharges . . . . We have scrutinized this
language for any hint that it is limited to "active" polluters or those who "actually
release pollutants", but we find no ambiguity and no support for Aardvark's argument.
The clause unambiguously withholds coverage for injury or damage "arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants (emphasis added), not merely the
insured's discharge, dispersal, release, or escape "of pollutants." As the district court
aptly wrote in Federal Insurance Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp
[169, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1989), modified, 738 E Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 928 F2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1991)], "the exclusion clause makes no reference at all to active
polluters or passive polluters. The terms are foreign to the policy in question."
Id. (quoting Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assoc., 942 F.2d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1991)).
114. O'Brien Energy, 629 A.2d at 964.
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principles upon which pollution exclusion clauses are to be
interpreted in Pennsylvania, none of them address the specific
issue in Madison Construction. The issue in Madison
Construction, one of first impression for Pennsylvania courts, is
whether an absolute pollution exclusion, which does not contain
the requirement that the pollutants escape into the environment,
precludes coverage for damages caused by the release of pollutants
into an enclosed area.115 Lacking controlling Pennsylvania authority,
the trial court relied on Thfco Mooring, a North Carolina case, in
holding that the absolute pollution exclusion did not preclude
coverage in this factual situation."6 Cases from other jurisdictions
show a split in authority as to whether the absolute pollution
exclusion precludes coverage for the release of pollutants into a
confined space. A brief survey of these diverging decisions follows.
In interpreting absolute pollution exclusion clauses, unlike
Pennsylvania, a few jurisdictions have required the pollutants to
escape into the environment and have held exclusion clauses
inapplicable to the release of pollutants into an enclosed area."
7
The North Carolina Court of Appeals arrived at this conclusion in
Thfco Mooring."
8
In Thfco Mooring, Tufco Flooring was resurfacing the floors of a
Purdue chicken processing plant with a styrene monomer resin and
fumes created by the resin allegedly contaminated chicken in a
115. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 103-04.
116. See id. at 104. The Pennsylvania Superior Court did, however, address the issue of
whether a qualified pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage for the release of
pollutants in an enclosed area in Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In this case, a restaurant operated by Gamble Farm Inn was insured
under a commercial general liability policy with a pollution exclusion that contained the
requirement that the pollutants escape "into or upon land, the atmosphere, or any water
course or body of water." See Gamble Farm Inn, 656 A.2d at 142-43. The restaurant's hot
water heater malfunctioned and released carbon monoxide, injuring patrons. See id. at 142.
In determining whether these damages were precluded by the exclusion, the court concluded
that the term "atmosphere" was ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor of the
insured. Id. at 146. The court based its finding of ambiguity on the fact that the term
"atmosphere" had more than one reasonable meaning. Id. at 144. In its broadest meaning, the
term atmosphere could certainly include the air within the restaurant; however, in a
narrower meaning, it would only include the air outside of the restaurant. Id. at 144-45. As a
result, the court concluded that the qualified exclusion did not preclude coverage for
damages caused by the release of pollutants in a confined space because the term
"atmosphere" in the exclusion clause was ambiguous, and therefore the clause had to be
construed against its drafter. Id. at 147.
117. See 7Tufco Flooring, 609 S.E.2d at 699. See also Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d
617, 622-23 (Md. 1995).
118. See Tufco Flooring, 609 S.E.2d at 693.
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nearby freezer. 1' 9 Tufco Flooring was insured by West American
under a general commercial liability policy that contained an
absolute pollution exclusion clause. 120  West American denied
coverage of Thfco Flooring's claim based on the exclusion, and
Tufco Flooring sought a declaratory judgment to determine if West
American was contractually obligated to provide coverage of the
claim. 2 ' The trial court granted Tufco Flooring's motion for
summary judgment.
1 22
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed and
held that the exclusion did not preclude coverage because the
pollutants did not escape into the environment. 123 The court found
that, prior to 1985, pollution exclusion clauses in general
commercial liability policies were qualified exclusions that required
the alleged pollution to escape into the environment.12 4 Explaining
that the historical purpose of an exclusion was to limit an insurer's
potentially infinite liability arising from the repeated escape of
toxic materials into the environment, the court reasoned that the
change from qualified to absolute exclusions in 1985 did not alter
the scope of these exclusions. 25 Additionally, the court relied on a
drafting document that failed to indicate that the change from a
qualified exclusion to an absolute exclusion was intended to
"expand the scope of the clause to non-environmental damage." 26
Consequently, the court held that even in the absence of explicit




120. See id. at 694. The West American policy contains a pollution exclusion that is
identical to the exclusion in Madison Construction, which can be found in note 12.
121. See id. at 694. Perdue filed a complaint against Tufco Flooring asking for $500,000
in damages, the value of the contaminated chicken that had to be destroyed. See id. at 693.
122. See id. at 694.
123. Tufco Flooring, 409 S.E.2d at 699.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. In Madison Construction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
pollution exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous on its face. See Madison
Construction, 735 A-2d at 110. Consequently, the court was barred from attempting to infer
the intent of the parties to the insuring agreement from extrinsic evidence as the North
Carolina Court of Appeals did in Tufco Flooring. See Lower Paxon, 557 A.2d at 402-03. The
Madison Construction court was not free to consider the history of the exclusion or its
drafting documents. See id.
127. See Tufco Flooring, 409 S.E. 2d at 699. Again, unlike the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Tufco Flooring, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not free to read terms into
the exclusion. See O'Brien Energy, 629 A.2d at 963. Justice Saylor stated that:
if the pollution exclusion clause, by its express terms, does not require that a
2000
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Other jurisdictions, like Pennsylvania, place primary emphasis on
the language of the insurance contract and have precluded
coverage for the release of pollutants into an enclosed area under
absolute pollution exclusions. 128 These courts have refused to graft
onto the absolute exclusion the additional requirement that the
pollutants escape into the environment.'29
In League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust v. City of Coon
Rapids, 30 the City of Coon Rapids operated an ice skating arena
that was insured by the League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust
("Insurance Trust") under a general commercial liability policy that
included an absolute pollution exclusion. 31 Patrons of the arena
were injured when nitrogen dioxide produced by a zamboni built
up in the arena due to a lack of proper ventilation. 132 The Insurance
Trust sought and was granted a declaratory judgment stating that
coverage of the patrons' claims against the City was precluded
under the pollution exclusion.13 -3 On appeal, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the exclusion was clear and
unambiguous and that coverage was precluded, even though the
nitrogen dioxide was released into the arena, an enclosed area.1
Like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Madison Construction, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in the absence of explicit language,
refused to read into the exclusion the additional requirement that
the pollutants be released into the environment."
35
In West American Insurance Co. v. Band & Desenberg,136 the
partnership of Band & Desenberg owned an office building that
was insured by West American Insurance Company ("West
discharge or dispersal be "into the environment" or "into the atmosphere," then the
court is not at liberty to insert such a requirement in order to effect what it considers
to be the true or correct meaning of the clause.
Id. at 108.
128. See West American Ins. Co. v. Band & Desenberg, 925 F. Supp 758, 762 (M.D. Fla.
1996).
129. See id.
130. 446 N.W2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
131. See League of Minnesota Cities, 446 N.W.2d at 420. The League of Minnesota
Cities' policy contains a pollution exclusion that is similar to the exclusion in Madison
Construction found in note 12.
132. See id.
133. See id. In their personal injury suit, the patrons "alleged the city was negligent in
failing to adequately ventilate the arena, failing to properly maintain the zamboni machine,
failing to warn the plaintiffs, and failing to test the air quality as required by Minnesota
health regulations." See id.
134. Id. at 422.
135. Id; see Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 108.
136. 925 F. Supp 758 (M.D. Fla 1996).
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American") under a general commercial liability policy that
included an absolute pollution exclusion. 137 Employees of one of
the building's tenants claimed that they suffered from sick building
syndrome, caused by pollutants in the building's air conditioning
system.'35 The employees demanded that West American settle their
claims against the partnership, but West American refused based on
the pollution exclusion in its policy.139 West American then sought a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, precluding coverage of the employees'
claims.
140
Relying on West American Insurance Co. v. Thfco Flooring, the
partnership argued that the pollution exclusion should only apply
to preclude coverage for environmental pollution 4' and that they
were covered by the policy because the pollutants in the air
conditioning system were not discharged into the environment.
142
Finding for West American, the district court held that the
exclusion was clear and unambiguous and that "dispersal of
contaminants from the attic space of the building into the indoor
air supply of the building" was sufficient to trigger the pollution
exclusion. 43 Like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Madison
Construction, the Band & Desenberg court held that the absolute
pollution exclusion was applicable to indoor pollution, and it
refused to rewrite the exclusion so as to require the discharge of
pollutants into the environment. 4
4
The pollution exclusion clauses in Techalloy, Lower Paxon, and
O'Brien Energy are qualified exclusion clauses because they
require that the pollutants escape into the environment to trigger
the exclusion clause, and are inapplicable if the escape of the
137. See Band & Desenberg, 925 E Supp. at 759-60. The West American policy contains
a pollution exclusion that is identical to the exclusion in Madison Construction, which can
be found in note 12.
138. See id. at 760. Sick building syndrome "is caused by a variety of contaminants in
the indoor air that give rise to indoor air pollution." Id. The employees claimed that there
injuries resulted "from a poorly designed air conditioning system that has allowed air-borne
contaminants from the attic space into into the buildings office space." Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Band & Desenberg, 925 F.Supp. at 761-62.
142. Id. at 760. The district court 'explained that in West American Ins. Co. v. Tufco
looring, the North Carolina Court of Appeals based its holding that the absolute pollution
exclusion still required a discharge into the environment on the historical purposes of the
exclusion, and that Florida law barred it from examining such extrinsic evidence because it
concluded that the exclusion was clear and unambiguous. Id. at 762.




pollutants is "sudden and accidental." 45 In contrast, the pollution
exclusion clause in Madison Construction is an absolute exclusion
clause; it does not explicitly require that the pollutants escape into
the environment to trigger the exclusion, and there is no "sudden
and accidental" exception. 146 Although the exclusion clauses differ,
Techalloy, Lower Paxon, and O'Brien Energy establish the
principles of interpretation that Pennsylvania courts should follow
in interpreting absolute pollution exclusion clauses. First, in
general, pollution exclusion clauses are clear and unambiguous and
therefore must be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.
147
Second, public policy considerations cannot be permitted to
interfere with the application of this plain and ordinary meaning. 14
Third, because the exclusion clauses are clear and unambiguous on
their face, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to demonstrate the
subjective intent of the parties to the insuring agreement. 49 Fourth,
courts are not permitted to read terms or requirements into the
exclusion clause. 150
With these principles and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
strong commitment to the canon that in a contract dispute, its only
goal is to "ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the
language of the written instrument," 51 it was no surprise that the
court held that the absolute pollution exclusion clause in Madison
Construction's commercial general liability policy relieved
Harleysville of its duty to defend Madison against Mr. Ezzi's
claim.152 Looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of the language
in the exclusion clause, the court concluded that the language was
clear and unambiguous.'5 The exclusion clause used the terms
"discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of
pollutants"-1 and the court used the dictionary definition of these
145. See Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 104.
146. See id.
147. See Techalloy, 487 A.2d at 826.
148. See Lower Paxon, 557 A-2d at 397.
149. See id. at 402-03. "The primary objective of contract interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the parties as it is reasonably manifested by the language of their
written contract." O'Brien Energy, 629 A.2d at 960 (citing Toombs NJ Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 591 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).
150. See O'Brien Energy, 629 A.2d at 962.
151. Standard Venetian Blind, 469 A.2d at 566.
152. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 110.
153. Id. at 108. "Words of common usage in an insurance policy are to be construed in
their natural, plain, and ordinary sense .... " Id. (citing Easton v. Washington County Ins.
Co., 137 A.2d 332, 335 (Pa. 1957)).
154. Madison Constr., 735 A-2d at 102.
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terms to conclude that they only required movement of the
pollutant.'55 Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms,
the court held that the movement of the Eucocure Floor Coat from
the concrete to the air in the construction envelope was sufficient
to trigger the exclusion clause. 156 As a result, the court refused to
read into the exclusion clause the additional requirement that the
pollutants escape into the environment.
157
The Pennsylvania high court's adherence to the plain meaning
standard in Madison Construction is far too rigid for the just
resolution of modern insurance contract disputes. It looked at the
plain and ordinary meaning of the terms in the pollution exclusion
clause as determined by their dictionary definitions, and from these
definitions concluded that no ambiguity existed.15 This method of
interpretation is clearly problematic because no word has one plain
and ordinary meaning. Wigmore eloquently stated this point when
he wrote, "[t]he fallacy consists in assuming there is or ever can be
some one real or absolute meaning."15 9 The meaning of a word
depends upon its context; thus, a word's meaning changes as the
context in which the word must be read changes. This is a truth
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to apply.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not read the terms
"discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape"1'0 in
the proper context of a specialized clause in an insurance contract
designed to deal with environmental pollution. Rather, it read the
terms in a more general, all-purpose context. Consequently, the
court failed to recognize that, in addition to their general meaning
as determined by a standard dictionary, these terms also could
have specialized meanings as "environmental terms of art."'
61 If
read in the proper context, the terms in the exclusion clause have
two reasonable meanings. The first meaning, merely requiring any
movement of the pollutant, and the second meaning, requiring the
movement of the pollutant into the environment. As a result, the
court should have concluded that the terms in the exclusion clause
where susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations and




159. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2462 (1981).
160. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 102.




In Thfco Mooring, the North Carolina Court of Appeals took a
more flexible approach to the interpretation of a similar pollution
exclusion clause, which is better suited to the just resolution of
modem insurance contract disputes. Instead of only looking to the
language of the exclusion clause, the Thfco Mooring court
considered the history of these exclusion clauses.1  From this
history, the court realized that the purpose of these pollution
exclusion clauses was to limit the liability of insurers for
environmental pollution and that this purpose narrowed the scope
of the exclusion clauses to environmental damage, requiring the
movement of pollutants into the environment.'1"
In Madison Construction, the trial court adopted this progressive
reasoning, but the supreme court dismissed it as a blatant violation
of "settled principles of contract interpretation," because the trial
court failed to "acknowledge" the plain meaning of the language in
the exclusion clause.'6 5 While this may be true, the supreme court
should have and could have relaxed these rigid principles. As Dr.
John Murray states in his well-known treatise on contracts, "[wlhile
the interpretation process should begin with the usual and ordinary
meaning of the words in a contract, courts should be willing to
admit evidence that would supercede the usual meaning." 16  If the
supreme court had considered the history of these pollution
exclusion clauses, while it may not have concluded that the terms
"discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape"
167
absolutely required the movement of pollutants into the
environment as the North Carolina Court of Appeals did in Tufco
M~ooring,168 it may have realized that the terms were at least
162. Id. at 106 (citing Gamble Farm, 656 A.2d at 144).
163. Id. at 104.
164. Thfco Flooring, 409 S.E.2d at 699. As mentioned supra in note 16, Tufco Mooring
was overruled in part by Gaston County Dyeing. See Gaston County Dyeing, 524 S.E.2d at
565. In Gaston County Dyeing, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that:
[IJt is well-established North Carolina law that the language of the insurance policy
controls, and in the instant case, we determine that property damage occurred for
purposes of the applicable policies at the time of the injury-in-fact. To the extent that
Tufco purports to establish a bright-line rule that property damage occurs "for
insurance purposes" at the time of manifestation or on the date of discovery, that
decision is overruled.
Gaston County Dyeing, 524 S.E.2d at 565.
165. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 108.
166. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACM § 86 (3d ed. 1990).
167. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 102.
168. Id. at 104.
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susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations and were
therefore ambiguous. 16 9
Bryan C. Devine
169. Id. at 106 (citing Gamble Farm, 656 A.2d at 144).

